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BENEFIT TO THE PROMISOR AS CONSIDERATION
FOR A SECOND PROMISE FOR THE SAME ACT
NUMEROUS theories have been advanced to explain the origin
of the common law doctrine of consideration. It has been de-
nominated a modification of the Roman causa, adopted by courts
of equity and borrowed therefrom by the courts of common law.'
It has been said to be derived from the requirement of a quid pro
quo in the action of debt.2 It has been declared to have its ante-
cedent in the requirement of damage to the plaintiff in the action
on the case for deceit.3 And finally it has been asserted to have
evolved from both of the last mentioned requirements.' But
whatever its source, it is certain that from the beginning of the
seventeenth century, if not from an earlier time, benefit to the
promisor received by him from the promisee in exchange for the
promise has been at least as efficacious a support for such a prom-
ise as detriment suffered by the promisee.5 Some modern com-
1. Salmond, Essays in jurisprudence and Legal History, IV. But see
Pollock, Principles of Contract, third Am. ed. 191.
2. Holmes, The Common Law, 285. But see Pollock & Maitland, History
of English Law, I, p. 212.
3. Hare, Contracts, Ch. VII.
4. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 129; 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
5. Pickas v. Guile, (1609) Yelv. 128. See also Riches v. Brigges, (1601)
Yelv. 4.
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mentators, however, have attempted to simplify the definition of
consideration by making detriment to the promisee suffered in
exchange for the promise, the exclusive test,6 partly because this
test is historically more accurate,7 and partly because a benefit to
the promisor involves a detriment to the promisee." It is not,
and indeed, could not be, contended that the courts have con-
sciously discarded benefit to the promisor as a test of consider-
ation, for not only has no case been cited which declares detri-
ment to the promisee to be the only test, but, on the contrary,
practically every modem court which attempts to give a defini-
tion of consideration includes benefit to the promisor as an alter-
native test.9
I The fact that the test of detriment may preserve "the historic
connection between the modern simple contract and the ancient
6. "At the present day, it is doubtless just and expedient to resolve every
consideration into a detriment to the promisee incurred at the request of
the promisor." Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 129; 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
"This definition makes what the promisee gives-that is, the detriment
suffered by him-the universal test of the sufficiency of consideration,
" . . Williston, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 33.
7. "Professor Langdell has pointed out the irrelevancy of the notion of
benefit to the promisor, and makes-detriment to the promisee the universal
test of consideration. This simplified definition has met with much favor.
It is concise, and it preserves the historic connection between the modern
simple contract and the ancient assumpsit in its primitive form of an ac-
tion for damage to a promisee by a deceitful promisor." Ames, Lectures
on Legal History, 323; 12 Harv. L. Rev. 515.
S. "It is said that any benefit conferred by the promisee on the prom-
isor, or any detriment incurred by the promisee may be. a consideration.
It is also thought that every consideration may be reduced to a case of
the latter sort, using the word 'detriment' in a somewhat broad sense."
Holmes, The Common Law, 289, 290.
"The fact is, however, that the cases in which there is a benefit to
the promisor invariably involve a detriment to the promisee." 6 R. C. L.
655.
9. "'Consideration,' says Mr. Justice Patterson in Thomas v. Thomas,
(1842) 2 Q. B. 851, 'means something which is of some value in the eye
of the law moving from the plaintiff; it may be some benefit to the de-
fendant, or some detriment to the plaintiff.' At any rate, it must be some
benefit to the plaintiff, or detriment to the person from whom it moves,
and of some value in the eye of the law." Wilson, C. J., in New York,
etc., Co. v. Martin, (1868) 13 Minn. 417, 419 (386, 388).
"To be a sufficient consideration it is necessary that plaintiffs' prom-
ise be a benefit to defendant, or an injury to plaintiffs." Berry, J., in
Bailey v. Austrian, (1873) 19 Minn. 535, 538 (465).
"That consideration may consist of detriment or disadvantage to
plaintiff, or waiver of a right by him, as well as of a benefit to defend-
ant." Canty, J., in Grant v. Duluth, etc., Ry. Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 395,
397, 398, 63 N. W. 1026.
See also 6 R. C. L. 654, and cases cited in note 12; 2 Words and
Phrases, 1444-47; 1 id. (N.S.) 902-6; Bennett, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 257;
Williston, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 522-4.
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assumpsit in its primitive form" is interesting but not, in any
sense, controlling. Of course, if benefit to the promisor invari-
ably results in detriment to the promisee, brevity and concise-
ness would dictate the adoption of detriment to the promisee as
the exclusive test. But if situations may arise in which there
is benefit to the promisor without detriment to the promisee, then
the universally accepted definition of consideration should not be
further limited. For however the doctrine of consideration came
into our law, the justification for its retention lies in the general
policy of refusing to enforce gratuitous promises.1 0 And cer-
tainly a promise paid for by benefit to the promisor has as sound
a basis, in policy and reason, for its enforcement as one resting
upon detriment to the promisee."'
Before entering upon a discussion of the cases where the de-
cision will turn upon the inclusion or exclusion of benefit to the
promisor as a test of consideration, it will be expedient to clear
the ground by establishing or admitting a few preliminary propo-
sitions. First, by benefit and detriment are meant legal benefit and
legal detriment as distinguished from actual benefit and actual
detriment. The terms are not synonymous. In fact, actual benefit
may constitute legal detriment and vice versa. 12 The theory of Mr.
Ames would make actual detriment as effectual as legal detri-
ment, for hd defined consideration as any act, promise or for-
bearance given in exchange for a promise." But no courts have
gone so far. Second, in bilateral contracts the contract is com-
plete at the moment when the promises are exchanged, but not
every exchange of promises will consummate a contr-act, for the
courts look at the content and not at the form of the promise.
Commentators have engaged in a spirited controversy concern-
10. "Form and consideration are two alternative conditions of the valid-
ity of contracts and of certain other kinds of agreements . . . They
are intended as a precaution against the risk of giving legal efficacy to
unconsidered promises and to levities of speech." Salmond, Jurisprudence,
fourth ed., 316.
11. It must be admitted that the English rule which requires the con-
sideration to move from the promisee is opposed to this conclusion. Dun-
lop, etc., Co. v. Selfridge Co., (1915) A. C. 847. But this rule does not
prevail in America: Palmer Savings. Bank v. Insurance Co., (1896) 166
Mass. 189, 44 N. E. 211; Rector, etc., of St. Mark's Church v. Teed,
(1890) 120 N. Y. 583, 24 N. E. 1014.
12. Talbott v. Stemmon's Ex., (1889) 89 Ky. 222, 12 S. W. 297, 5 L. R.
A. 856, 25 Am. St. Rep. 531; Devecmon v. Shaw, (1888) 69 Md. 199, 14
Atl. 464, 9 Am. St. Rep. 422; Hamer v. Sidway, (1891) 124 N. Y. 538, 27
N. E..256, 12 L. R. A. 463, 21 Am. St. Rep. 693; White v. Bluett, (1853)
23 L. J. Ex. 36, 2 W. R. 75.
13. Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 323; 1Z Harv. L. Rev. 515.
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ing the definition of consideration in such contracts. That sug-
gested by Leake and amplified and explained by Mr. Williston
makes the character of the act or forbearance promised, rather
than the mere promise, the criterion; generally speaking, when
the act promised would, if performed, constitute consideration,
the promise to perform it will be consideration, unless such
promise is made void by some rule of law other than that relating
to consideration. 14 This, it is submitted, squares best with the
decisions. It avoids the artificiality of the test of Mr. Ames,' s
and it is not open to the objection of question begging urged
against the view of Mr. Langdell.' 6 Third, whether benefit to
the promisor be excluded from the definition of consideration or
not, the same result will be reached in most cases, including that
class of cases where A, in exchange for C's promise does, or
promises C to do, something which A is already under legal obli-
gation to C to do.
On account of the confusion by some courts of this class of
cases, viz., those in which the previous obligation is from A to C,
with those where A's previous obligation is to B, it will be advis-
able to examine them in some detail. They may be separated
into three subdivisions: (1) Where the previous obligation of
A to C is under a bilateral contract, which has not yet been
fully performed on either side; (2) where the previous obliga-
tion of A to C is under a unilateral contract, or under an origi-
nally bilateral contract which has become unilateral by perform-
ance on C's part; (3) where the previous obligation of A to C
is owed to C as a member of the public.
In cases of the first subdivision, it has been suggested that
the second agreement between A and C amounts to a dissolu-
14. Williston, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 527, 528. As pointed out by Mr.
Williston, it is difficult to bring within any reasonable definition of con-
sideration bilateral contracts in which one of the promises is voidable
at the option of the promisor.
15. "The act of each promisee in the case of mutual promises is obvi-
ously the giving of his own promise animo contrahendi in exchange for
the similar promise of the other. And this is all that either party gives
to the other. This, then, must be the consideration for each promise;
and it is ample on either of the two theories of consideration under dis-
cuss ion. For the giving of the promise is not only an act, but an act that
neither was under any obligation to give. This simple analysis of the
transaction of mutual promises is free from arbitrary assumptions and
from all reasoning in a circle." Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 342,
343; 13 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 32.
16. See Williston, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 34, 35; 27 id. 503, 505, 506. Lang-
dell, 14 id. 496' Ames, 13 id. 30-32.
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tion of the first contract, whereby A relinquishes all his rights
against C in consideration of C's relinquishing all his rights
against A, and the formation of a new contract wherein A and C
assume new mutual obligations. The only difficulty with this
theory is that frequently it does not accord with the facts. As
well said by the Minnesota Supreme Court:
"The doctrine of these cases as it is frequently applied does
not commend itself either to our judgment or our sense of justice,
for where the refusal to perform and the promise to pay extra
compensation for performance of the contract are one transaction,
and there are no exceptional circumstances making it equitable
that an increased compensation should be demanded and paid,
no amount of astute reasoning can change the plain fact that
the party who refuses to perform, and thereby coerces a promise
from the other party to the contract to pay him an increased com-
pensation for doing that which he is legally bound to do, takes an
unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other party. To
hold, under such circumstances, that the party making the prom-
ise for extra compensation is presumed to have voluntarily elected
to relinquish and abandon all of his rights under the original
contract, and to substitute therefor the new or modified agree-
ment is to wholly disregard the natural inference to be drawn
from the transaction, and invite parties to repudiate their con-
tract obligations whenever they can gain thereby.
"There can be no legal presumption that such a transaction
is a voluntary rescission or modification of the original contract,
for the natural inference to be drawn from it is otherwise in the
absence of any equitable considerations justifying the demand for
extra pay. In such a case the obvious inference is that the party
so refusing to perform his contract is seeking to take advantage
of the necessities of the other party to force from him a promise
to pay a further sum for that which he is already legally entitled
to receive. Surely it would be a travesty on justice to hold that
the party so making the promise for extra pay was estopped from
asserting that the promise was without consideration. A party
cannot lay the foundation of an estoppel by his own wrong. If
it be conceded that by the new promise the party obtains that
which he could not compel, viz. a specific performance of the
contract by the other party, still the fact remains that the one
party has obtained thereby only that which he was legally en-
titled to receive, and the other party has done only that which he
was legally bound to do. How, then, can it be said that the, legal
rights or obligations of the party are changed by the new prom-
ise? It is entirely competent for the parties to a contract to mod-
ify or to waive their rights under it, and ingraft new terms upon
it, and in such a case the promise of one party is the considera-
tion for that of the other; but where the promise to the one is
simply a repetition of a subsisting legal promise there can be no
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consideration for the promise of the other party, and there is- no
warrant for inferring that the parties have voluntarily rescinded
or modified their contract."' 7
In other words, the alleged dissolution is a mere fiction. The
fact is, that usually neither party for a single instant releases the
other so as to leave him entirely free; but one of the parties, C,
merely assumes additional obligations.
Curiously enough, the Minnesota court is willing to give this
fiction validity in certain cases.
"But where the party refusing to complete -his contract does
so by reason of some unforeseen and substantial difficulties in
the performance of the contract, which were not known o r an-
ticipated by the parties when the contract was entered into, and
which place upon him an additional burden not contemplated by
the parties, and the opposite party promises him extra pay oir
benefits if he will complete his contract, and he so promises, the
promise to pay is supported by a valid consideration. In such a
case the nattiral inference arising from the transaction, if un-
modified by any equitable considerations, is" rebutted and' the
presumption arises that by the 'oluntary and mutual promises
of the parties their respective rights and. obligations under the
original contract are waived., and those of the new or modified
contract.substituted foi- thiemf"Cas-esof this character form
an exception to the general rule that a promise to do that which
a party is already legally bound to do is not a sufficient considera-
tion to support a promise by the other party to the contract to give
the former an additional compensation or benefit.""'
If the unforeseen difficulties were such- as to constitute a
mutual mistake of fact, or were of such character as to form a
basis for equitable relief from the terms of the contract,, then,
of course, by performing or promising to perform, A would un-
dergo legal detriment and C would obtain a legal benefit; and
there would be no question as to the sufficiency of the considera-
tion. But this is not the basis of the court's dictum.
"What unforeseen difficulties and burdens will make a party's
refusal to go forward with his contract equitable, so as to take the
case out of the general rule and bring it within the exception,
must depend upon the facts of each lparticular case. They must
be substantial, unforeseen, and not within the contemplation
of the parties when the contract was made. They need fiot be
-such -as would legally justify the party in his refusal to perform
17. King v. Duluth, etc., Ry. Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 482, 63 N. W. 1105,
per Start, C. J. The great weight of authority is in accord. The cases
are collected in Pollock, Principles of Contract, third Am. ed., 203, note 15.
18. (1895) 61 Minn. 487, 488.
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his contract, unless promised extra pay, or to justify a court of
equity in relieving him from the contract; for they are sufficient
if they are of such a character as to render the party's demand
for extra pay manifestly fair, so as to rebut all inference that
he is seeking to be relieved from an unsatisfactory contract, or
to take advantage of the necessities of the opposite party to coerce
from him a promise for further compensation. Inadequacy of
the contract price which is the result of an error of judgment,
and not of some excusable mistake of fact, is not sufficient.
"The cases of Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29 'N.'Y. 198, where
the unforeseen difficulty in the execution of the contract was
quicksand, in place of expected ordinary earth excavation, and
Michaud v. MacGregor, supra, p. 198, 63 N. AV. 479, where
the unforeseen obstacles were rocks below the surface of the
lots to be excavated, which did not naturally belong there, but
were placed there by a third party, and of the existence of which
both parties to the contract were ignorant when the contract was
made, are illustrations of what unforeseen difficulties will take
a case out of the general rule."1 9
Since the court recognizes that in the usual cases any pre-
sumption as to dissolution of the first contract is a mere fiction,
and in the extraordinary case raises such presumption out of the
equity and justice of the situation it would seem to follow that
the presumption would be irrebuttable, and an actual refusal
to agree to a rescission or dissolution would be immaterial. Clear-
ly there is no basis in logic or precedent for any such exception
to the doctrine of consideration. It is merely a modification of
the doctrine on so-called equitable grounds. It has been adopted
in Maryland.
20
In cases of the second subdivision, 21 there is no room for the
operation of any fiction of dissolution or rescission, for C has
fully performed. And it does not aid the situation to state it in
terms of waiver, for if waiver and not estoppel is meant, there
is still need for consideration. Yet the equity and justice of
the situation are just the same whether C has fully, or only par-
tially performed. It is difficult to see how any distinction could
reasonably be drawn between the cases in the two subdivisions,
where the Minnesota dictum prevails. Where the mere dissolu-
tion theory obtains, clearly no consideration for C's second prom-
ise can be found.
22
19. Id. 488.
20. Linz v. Schuck, (1907) 106 Md. 220, 67 AtI. 286, 11 L. R. A. (N.S.)
789.
21. See page 386, supra.
22. But see Peck v. Requa, (1859) 13 Gray (Mass.) 407.
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Cases of the third subdivision2 3 present no difficulty, for C's
promise is unenforceable not only for lack of consideration, but
also on grounds of public policy. 24
It must be apparent that in this entire class of cases, neither
detriment to A, the promisee, nor benefit to C, the promisor, is
exchanged for the promise. A does nothing, forbears nothing,
which he is not legally obligated to do or forbear; C receives
nothing which he is not legally entitled to receive from A. Hence,
these cases would furnish no basis for objecting to the exclusion
of benefit to the promisor as a criterion of consideration.
From these cases has been drawn the rule that doing or
promising to do what one is already legally bound to do is not
sufficient consideration to support a promise. And it should con-
stantly be borne in mind that this rule is not a statement of a
primary principle, but merely a deduction from a particular class
of cases, where the context remedies the obvious incompleteness
of the statement. Legally bound to whom? To the other con-
tracting party, C, or to the community of which C is a member,
so that performance of the obligation or a promise to perform
it results in no legal detriment to the promisee and in no legal
benefit to the promisor, C. The idea intended to be emphasized
by this phrasing is the distinction between actual benefit and
detriment on the one hand, and legal benefit and detriment on
the other. The majority of American courts, however, have
failed or refused to recognize the limitations of this secondary
rule, and have applied it to cases where the previous obligation of
A was owed to B, and the later promise is made by C. 25  A
respectable minority of our courts and the English courts do
make a distinction and hold C's promise supported by a sufficient
consideration.2 6 Most of the commentators agree with the Eng-
23. See page 386, supra.
24. Cases of this class are collected in notes in 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1170,
48 id. 392, (rewards); Pollock, Principles of Contract, third Am. ed.205, note 16, (rewards) ; Ames, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 517, note 1, (refrainingfrom tort) ; Cyc., IX, 347, 348, notes 40, 41, 43, 46.
25. Havana, etc., Co. v. Ashurst, (1893) 148 Ill. 115, 35 N. E. 873; Har-
ris v. Cassady, (1886) 107 Ind. 158, 8 N. E. 29; Newton v. Chicago, etc.,Ry. Co., (1885) 66 Ia. 422, 23 N. W. 905; Schuler v. Myton, (1892) 48Kan. 282; Putnam v. Woodbury, (1878) 68 Me. 58; Gordon v. Gordon,(1875) 56 N. H. 170; Arend v. Smith, (1897) 151 N. Y. 502, 45 N. E. 872;Sherwin v. Brigham, (1883) 39 Oh. St. 137; Wimar v. Overseers, (1883)104 Pa. St. 317; Hanks v. Barron, (1895) 95 Tenn. 275, 32 S. W. 195;
Kenigsberger v. Wingate. (1868) 31 Tex. 42; Davenport v. Congrega-
"tional Society, (1873) 33 Wis. 317; Cyc., IX, 353, 354, note 73.
26. Bagge v. Slade, (1616) 3 Bulstr. 162; Shadwell v. Shadwell, (1860)
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lish decisions and attempt to explain them by finding detriment
to C.
Mr. Ames finds detriment in "any act or forbearance given in
exchange for a promise. ' 27 The difficulty with this definition is
that it includes too much; it takes no account of the character of
the act; the sole question is whether the act is referable to the
promise. If the agreement between A and C is bilateral, then
Mr. Ames would regard A's physical exertion in expressing the
words of promise as constituting a detriment in that A was
under no obligation to express them.28  As pointed out above,
the courts look to the content and not to the form of the promise.
And what the parties desire is the thing promised, not the mere
expression of promise. Of course, if what C really desired was
to have A undergo this physical exertion, and to exchange his
promise therefor, Mr. Ames' position would be unanswerable.
Mr. Anson explains the situation by saying that A abandons or
agrees to abandon his right to make an arrangement with B,
whereby A and B shall put an end to their contract "by mutual
waiver of promises" and "the abandonment of a right has always
been held to be a consideration for a promise." 29  That is, Mr.
Anson finds detriment to A in his abandoning his right to rescind
the contract with B. The objection to this explanation is ob-
vious. It does not fit the facts. So long as the final result bar-
gained for by C is effectuated, C cares nothing about the exist-
ence or non-existence of contractual relations between A and B.
How could this theory be applied where C had no knowledge of
the contract between A and B, or where B had actually refused to
rescind the contract with A, or where B had by a previous agree-
meit with D expressly covenanted not to rescind his contract
with A, or where there was no possibility of rescission? Yet in
all these situations, so far as C is concerned, the thing which he
9 C. B. N. S. 159, 7 jur. N. S. 311, 30 L. J. C. P. 145, 3 L. T. N. S. 628,
9 NV. R. 163; Scotson v. Pegg; (1861) 6 H. & N. 295, 30 L. J. Exch. 225,
3 L. T. .N. S. 753, 9 W. R. 280; Humes v. Decatur, etc., Co., (1892) 98
Ala. 461, 473, 13 So. 368; Hirsch v. Chicago, etc., Co., (1899) 82 Ill. App.
234; Donnelly v. Newbold. (1901) 94 11d. 220; Abbott v. Doane, (1895)
163 Mass. 433, 40 N. E. 197; Day v. Gardner, (1881) 42 N. J. Eq. 199,
203, 7 Atl. 365; Bradley v. Glenmary Co., (1902) 64 N. J. Eq. 77, 53
Ati. 49; Cyc., IX, 354, notes 74 and 75.
In Minnesota the point is still undecided. Grant v. Duluth, etc., Ry.
Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 395, 398, 63 N. W. 1026.
27. 12 Harv. L. Rev. 531.
28. 13 id. 29, 32.
29. Anson, Law of Contracts, twelfth ed., 109.
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calls for in exchange for his promise is the same. And if that
thing is furnished by C, could it be said that he had broken his
promise by rescinding or modifying his contract with B? In
short, while there can be no doubt that A would be undergoing
a legal detriment by refraining from rescinding or promising so
to refrain, he would not be doing so in exchange for C's promise.
Mr. Justice Holmes begins his exposition of the problem by as-
suming that when A and B enter into their contract, A has the
option of breaking his contract and paying damages therefor or
of fulfilling its terms. If he gives up the former choice in ex-
change for C's promise, he undergoes a legal detriment. "A
brilliant paradox," says Sir Frederick Pollock. And such it
clearly is. since it asserts that to be a legal right for the doing of
which the law will compel one to pay damages.
Vhere the contract between A and C is unilateral with C as
promisor, Mr. Langdell supported the American cases; but where
it was bilateral, he found consideration for C's promise in the
detriment which A incurs by giving C the right to compel him to
act or forbear, "or the right to recover damages against him
for not doing it. One obligation is a less burden than two
(i. c. one to each of two persons) though each be to do the same
thing." 30 Anson3 and Williston 2 both point out the obvious
begging of the question in these statements. A comes under a
legal obligation to C only in case the bilateral agreement is bind-
ing. It is true C promises to do something which he is not bound
to A to do, and thereby prima facie incurs detriment. But C's
promise is binding only if it is supported by consideration. Is
A's promise consideration for C's promise? If A comes under a
legal obligation to C, the answer must be in the affirmative.
But A will not come under any obligation to C unless C's promise
is supported by a consideration. Hence to say that A does come
under a new obligation to C is to assume the very point at issue.
The only judicial support of this theory is a dictum.of the su-
preme court of the District of Columbia. 33
From the standpoint of detriment to the promisee, then, it
would seem impossible to find consideration either in A's promise
or in A's performance. A does nothing, forbears nothing
30. Langdell, Summary of Contracts, Sec. 84.
31. Anson, Law of Contracts, twelfth ed., 110.
32. 8 Harv. L. Rev. 34, 35.
33. M6errick v. Giddings, (1882) 1 Mack. 394, 411 per James, J.
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which he is not legally bound to do or forbear. He parts with
nothing which he is legally free to keep, does nothing which he is
legally free to refrain from doing, refrains from doing nothing
which he is legally free to do and consequently suffers no legal
detriment.
Does C receive a legal benefit? When A becomes bound to
B to act or to refrain from acting, B secures a chose in action
against A. So exclusively does this chose in action belong to B,
that originally it lacked the essential element of a property right,
namely, transferability. Consequently, C has absolutely no rights
in the contract between A and B, it matters not how much he
may benefit or suffer by the performance thereof. His gain or
loss in such case will be purely incidental or accidental. So far
as C is concerned, A may break his contract with B with im-
punity. In other words, C has no right by virtue of the contract
between A and B to have effectuated the act or forbearance stipu-
lated for in such contract. If in exchange for C's promise, C
does secure the effectuation of that act or forbearance, then C
has secured something to which he was not theretofore entitled,
in other words, a legal benefit. And if a legal benefit received in
exchange for a promise by the promisor from the promisee con-
stitutes sufficient consideration to support a promise, then C's
promise is enforceable.
The only possible question is whether A's act or forbear-
ance is properly referable to C's promise, that is, whether A's
act or forbearance has been in reliance upon and in exchange
for C's promise. This is, of course, a question of fact, which
in the ordinary case is very easy of solution. It is, obviously,
not essential that A's act be done solely in exchange for C's prom-
ise. It cannot be doubted that if X, Y and Z each separately
promised A to pay him a fixed and separate compensation for
doing a single designated act, A might earn the three separate
compensations by one performance, for the single promise of
X or Y or Z, or the combined promises of any two of them
might not have been sufficient inducement. And if A is under
legal obligation to B to complete a building or to do any other
act, and -is upon the point of breaking his contract with B, there
can be no doubt in fact that when C promises him additional com-
pensation if he will complete the building or do the other act,
his action in so doing is actually partly in exchange for C's
promise, and partly in exchange for the consideration furnished
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
by B. In the dissenting opinion in Shadwell v. Shadwell,4
Byles, J..suggested that A could not be. permitted to say that
his act was referable to C's promise, when he was already bound
to B. This is merely saying that the policy of the law will estop
A from showing the truth of the matter. Contracts of this sort
are frequently made and generally performed by business men
in the usual course of legitimate business; in the absence of fraud,
duress or sharp dealing there is nothing immoral in them. Hence
no considerations of public policy would seem to weigh against
them, and Byles' suggestion should not be controlling. Where
the latter agreement between A and C is bilateral, the referability
of A's act or forbearance to C's promise is all the more apparent.
And if the legal benefit conferred by such act or forbearance
constitutes consideration, then the promise to confer it would
likewise constitute consideration.
Here, then, is a class of cases in which legal benefit to the
promisor may exist without legal detriment to the promisee, in
which no sound reason of policy militates against the validity of
the later promise, and in which the inclusion of benefit td the
promisor as a test of consideration is essential to the enforceabil-
ity thereof. It is, therefore, submitted that no reason- exists for
modifying the traditional definition of consideration by phrasing
it in terms of detriment only.
EDMUND-M. MORGAN.
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
34. Shadwell v. Shadwell, supra, note 26.
